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THE EVOLUTION AND ENDPOINT OF RESPONSIBILITY: THE FCPA,
SOX, SOCIALIST-ORIENTED GOVERNMENTS, GRATUITOUS
PROMISES, AND A NOVEL CSR CODE
Aaron Einhorn'
Multinational corporations (MNC) have emerged as engines of global
development. Over the past fifty years, the number of multinational corporations,
the value of multinationals' investments in foreign countries, and the amount of
multinationals' wealth have increased dramatically.1  MNCs in developed
countries have taken advantage of well educated and inexpensive labor in
developing countries, allowing them to cut costs and generate higher profit
margins.2 The end of the Cold War ushered previously closed economies across
Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and China into the global economy,
opening untapped markets.3 Trade liberalization, engineered by the World Trade
Organization (WTO) and its member states, has fostered new business
relationships and eased corporate access to markets, goods, and services. Foreign
direct investment (FDI), defined as "a lasting interest by a resident entity in one
economy... in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor," has
grown exponentially. 4 In 1989, global FDI stood just below $200 billion.5 Seven
* Managing Editor, 2006-2007, Denver Journal of International Law and Policy.
1. See Earl H. Fry, North American Economic Integration: Policy Options, 9 POLICY PAPERS ON
THE AMERICAS 8, 2 (2003) (estimating also that, in 2002, approximately 65,000 multinationals operated
850,000 subsidiaries around the world); Beth Stephens, The Amorality of Profit: Transnational
Corporations and Human Rights, 20 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 45, 57 (2002) (highlighting that, while
nineteen countries had revenues greater than General Motors and only three corporations were among
the world's twenty-eight largest economic entities in 1991, in 2000 only seven countries had revenues
greater than General Motors and fifteen corporations were among the world's twenty-eight largest
economic entities); Inward FDI Flows by Host Region and Economy (1970-2005), in UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005: TRANSNATIONAL
CORPORATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D (2005) (reporting that in 1970 FDI
worldwide totaled $13.4 billion whereas in 1985 it totaled $58.0 billion and in 2005 totaled $945
billion, down from a high of $ 1.4 trillion in 2000); see also PAUL HIRST & GRAHAME THOMPSON,
GLOBALIZATION IN QUESTION (Polity Press 2d ed. 1999) (discussing how, between 1945 and the
present, the world economy has become more closely integrated).
2. PETER DICKEN, GLOBAL SHIFT: RESHAPING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC MAP IN THE 2 1 sT
CENTURY 26-51 (4th ed. 2003).
3. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 180-94 (2003) (discussing
how a transition to market economies has had positive and negative effects on the economies of former
communist states); Peter Wilkin, Revising the Democratic Revolution - Into the Americas, 24 THIRD
WORLD Q. 655, 656 (2003). One hundred and thirteen countries joined the World Trade Organization
at its inception in 1995. One-hundred fifty states are now members.
4. ORG. ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT
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years later FDI doubled to just below $400 billion, and by the year 2000 reached
$1.1 trillion.6 While only ten countries' FDI totals surpassed $10 billion in 1985,
corporations in thirty three countries invested over $10 billion abroad in the year
2000.7
The wealth corporations have enjoyed has not existed in isolation. Rather,
greater corporate wealth has produced greater corporate power that corporations
have exercised in both positive and negative manners.
Greater corporate power has cultivated unprecedented advances in health and
education over the past forty years.8 Corporations have developed new medicines,
revolutionized transportation 9, provided employment to millions, and generally
have assisted in raising the standard of living worldwide. 10 Corporations also have
contributed to rapid technological development, particularly in the area of
communications. Fiber optic systems and the internet have revolutionized the
speed at which ideas and knowledge can flow within countries and across
oceans, " forging a synergistic relationship between corporations and technology
that has propagated new technologies and fed corporate power. 12
At the same time, greater corporate power has been associated with a host of
problems. The wealth multinationals have brought to some countries has bypassed
many other countries.' 3 In some cases, the activities of multinational corporations
in developing countries have retarded economic growth. 14  Multinationals have
been accused of committing various human rights violations, such as carrying out
extra-judicial killings and employing child labor.'5  Corporate activities in
INVESTMENT 7 (3d ed. 1996), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/10/16/2090148.pdf
5. Inward FDI Flows by Host Region and Economy (1970-2005), supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. DICKEN, supra note 2, at 56.
8. STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 248.
9. DICKEN, supra note 2, at 91-93 (discussing how rapid modernization of transportation systems
has contributed to economic globalization).
10. STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 248.
11. DICKEN, supra note 2, at 95.
12. Id.
13. While this paper is concerned with the overall growth of FDI as that growth informs corporate
power, rather than with an analysis of whether and to what extent FDI is evenly distributed and
contributes to or hinders growth in certain countries, it is important to note that FDI flows to developing
countries are not even and that growth stemming from the internationalization of corporations has
bypassed many countries. While countries such as Thailand, Singapore, and Peru have enjoyed large
amounts of capital inflows and impressive growth, countries throughout Africa, Central America, South
America, Central Asia, Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and the Pacific Rim have seen relatively
stagnant and even decreasing FDI totals, and have not shared in the economic growth and poverty
reduction that many other countries have enjoyed. See Inward FDI Flows by Host Region and
Economy (1970-2005), supra note 1.
14. See, e.g., Ronaldo Munck, Neoliberalism, Necessitarianism and Alternatives in Latin
America: there is no alternative (TINA)?, 24 THIRD WORLD Q. 495, 501-03 (2003) (discussing how the
collapse of Argentina's economy in 2001 is largely attributable to the neoliberal prescriptions and the
rapid influx of multinational corporations through privatization of the economy).
15. See e.g, James Glanz & Sabrina Tavernise, Security Firm Faces Criminal Charges in Iraq,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2007.
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developing countries have been associated with environmental degradation,
dangerous work conditions, and mistreatment of indigenous people. 16 However, in
contrast to developed states, developing states have not successfully combated the
harms that have flowed from increased corporate power.17 A number of factors -
including weak domestic and international legal institutions, non-responsive heads
of state, the "race to the bottom,"' 18 and developed countries' economic dominance
- have prevented developing states from effectively addressing the negative
economic and social impacts of corporate activities. 19
The inability of many developing states to manage these problems has
sparked calls for a code of social responsibility that is able to regulate
multinational corporations.2 ° Countries and corporations have responded to these
cries. The United States and member States of the European Union (EU), the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the United
16. See Sarah M. Hall, Mulitnational Corporations' Post-UNOCAL Liabilities for Violations of
International Law, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 401, 416-17 (2002); Douglass Cassel, International
Security in the Post-Cold War Era: Can International Law Truly Effect Global Political and Economic
Stability? Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution, 19 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1963,
1964-66 (1996); AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 128 (Anchor Books 1999) (stating that
the rationale of the market mechanism, by which corporations operate, is geared to private goods, like
clothes and food, rather than public goods, like the environment).
17. In the United States, for example, from 1897 to 1934 the United States Supreme Court struck
down numerous state laws regulating working conditions under the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court's rulings held that the states
cannot use their police powers to enact legislation that interferes with employers' and employees' rights
to contract. As examples, the Supreme Court invalidated a New York statute forbidding employment in
bakeries for more than 60 hours a week, struck down labor legislation forbidding discrimination by
employers for union activity and prohibiting employers from requiring employees to sign "yellow dog"
contracts, and ruled that a federal statute prescribing minimum wages for women violated due process.
Many of the issues that the courts refused to address - unhealthy working conditions, discrimination,
and wages - are problems plaguing developing countries. In 1937, however, the Court reversed fifty
years of precedence. After its landmark opinion in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, the Supreme Court
began upholding as constitutional legislation that protected workers' rights and consumers' rights and
that interfered with the previously unfettered rights of business. Statutes that set a state minimum wage
for women, prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of "filled milk", fixed maximum fees for
employment agencies, and regulated opticians were now held to be constitutional. Since 1937, the
judiciary and legislators have established huge bodies of law that protect workers and consumers and
that regulate corporate power. See JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 274-304 (9th ed.
West Publishing, 2001).
18. Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT'L L. 639, 671-74 (1998). Discussions on bilateral
investment treaties often refer to a "race to the bottom." Competition over foreign direct investment
(FDI) can be fierce. This competition prompts countries to offer increasingly attractive incentives to
corporations in order to receive FDI. Thus, country A may allow company XYZ to repatriate profits.
Country B may then allow company XYZ to repatriate profits and may lower taxation of profits to 2%.
In turn, country A lowers taxation to 1% and frees company XYZ from pollution controls. This
competition for FDI via added concessions will continue until the costs of such concessions exceeds
their benefits.
19. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001).
20. Id. at 448.
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Nations (UN), and the International Labor Organization (ILO) have developed
codes that place non-binding social responsibilities on corporations.21 In addition,
many corporations voluntarily have drafted and adopted their own codes of
conduct, though, similar to measures drafted by intergovernmental organizations
(IGO), these codes are not legally binding.22
Because existing codes of conduct have limited ability to prevent and redress
corporate human rights abuses, the debate on whether to draft and how to structure
a binding corporate social responsibility (CSR) code continues. This article enters
that debate. It discusses events and circumstances occurring within the United
States, other countries, and the international community which, when viewed in
light of one another, suggest that states and corporations are moving towards
creating an enforceable code of corporate social responsibility. After discussing
these forces, this article offers an organizational framework for developing a CSR
code.
The article's first section examines corruption and bribery. It discusses
problems corruption creates in developed states and charts the evolution of U.S.
and international measures to combat corruption; measures which have placed
greater responsibilities upon corporations. The article's second section takes a
similar approach, first discussing broad corporate governance concerns that
surfaced over the past decade and then considering how the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
(SOX), and similar measures in Europe, have addressed these concerns.
After charting how the United States and European Union have placed greater
responsibilities upon corporations, the article analyzes a different force
contributing to the development of a CSR code. The article's third section
explains how the rise of socialist-oriented (SO) governments in Latin America will
advance progress towards a code of corporate social responsibility. Next, the
article's fourth section discusses human rights abuses and social harms that have
accompanied the spread of MNCs through developing states. This section then
analyses the various CSR measures the international community and multinational
corporations have adopted to counter these harms. The paper's fifth section
explains why the CSR measures that states, intergovernmental organizations, and
multinationals have enacted cannot successfully regulate corporate activity and
proposes a new and potentially useful framework for developing a CSR code.
Last, the sixth and final section ties together the information presented in previous
sections, summarizes how that information supports the article's thesis, and draws
conclusions.
I. CORRUPTION: PROBLEMS AND RESPONSES
While corruption is more pervasive in developing countries, it also produces
serious problems in developed states.23 When the magnitude of multinational
21. See infra notes 205,212, 215,218.
22. See infra notes 229, 230, 231, 232.
23. In developing states, corruption's effects are more varied and acute than in developed states.
Corruption undermines effective business practices and corrodes political institutions, leading to tainted
judiciaries, vote buying, venal police more concerned with collecting bribes than pursuing criminals,
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corporations' bribery of foreign officials came to light in the United States during
the 1970s, Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or the Act).
In 1998, the U.S. adopted a second round of amendments to the FCPA, enlarging
its jurisdiction and expanding its substance. By the turn of the century, states
worldwide had joined the battle against bribery, ratifying several anti-corruption
treaties. Analysis of how anti-corruption measures have evolved reveals that, over
time, states have placed greater responsibilities on corporations and have cut more
deeply into corporate power. This trend of imposing greater responsibilities on
corporations, when viewed in light of other events such as enactment of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the rise of SO governments in Latin America, and the
development of non-binding CSR codes, suggests a binding code of corporate
social responsibility lies on the horizon.
A. Problems Caused by Corruption
Corruption breeds various problems. When multinational corporations bribe
foreign officials to obtain contracts or secure more relaxed regulations, their venal
activities undermine effective business practices. 24  Bribery "can damage a
company's image, lead to costly lawsuits, cause the cancellation of contracts, and
result in the appropriation of valuable assets overseas. 25  Bribery also inflates
operating expenses, creating new costs companies would not absorb if they
obtained business legally, and wastes valuable resources.26 Instead of devoting
earnings to research and development, infrastructure, or shareholder dividends,
companies that pay bribes direct profits into foreign officials' pockets.27 As is
common in other regulatory contexts, a "race to the bottom" ensues.28  Officials
demand greater and greater sums. Corporations, competing with one another for
business, pay larger and larger bribes for access to markets and favorable treatment
until the marginal benefit of new payments decreases to zero.29 Such behavior is
not good for business.
In 1976, more than four hundred U.S. companies admitted to paying over
$300 million in bribes to foreign officials during the first half of the 1970s. 30 Gulf
Oil Corporation admitted to paying bribes in various countries, including $4
and weak rule of law. In-depth discussion of the effects of corruption in developing states is beyond the
scope of this paper. For a detailed analysis, see Tim Harford, Why Poor Countries are Poor, 37
REASON 32, 36 (2006); Robert Zuzowski, Corruption in Post-Communist Europe: Immorality Breeds
Poverty, 30 J. OF SOC. POL. AND ECON. STUD. 9, 12-15 (2005).
24. See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4-5 (1977).
25. Id. at 5.
26. Steven R. Salbu, Information Technology in the War Against International Bribery and
Corruption: The Next Frontier of Institutional Reform, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 67, 70-71 (2001).
27. Id. at 70-71.
28. Cf Sol Picciotto, Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The Antinomies of the
Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 731, 751 (1998) (stating that
smaller countries with weaker economies often feel pressured to offer incentives that they cannot
afford).
29. Cf Guzman, supra note 18, at 671-74. Although Guzman discusses the race to the bottom in
the context of bilateral treaties, the concept applies to the spiraling effects of corruption.
30. H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4
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million to the governing political party in South Korea; General Tire & Rubber
Company admitted to bribes in Algeria, Mexico and Venezuela; and Exxon
Corporation disclosed bribes in fifteen countries, including $19 million in Italy
alone.3' Most dramatically, the SEC discovered that Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation, at that time the largest defense contractor in the United States, had
been bribing prime ministers, presidents, and other high-ranking political figures in
several countries.32 By the end of 1976, updated studies revealed four hundred and
fifty U.S. companies had paid over $450 million in bribes since the decade
began.33
This pervasive corruption sparked government action. In 1977, officially
recognizing that "corporate bribery is bad business" and that it affects "the very
stability of business overseas" as well as "our domestic competitive climate, 34
the United States Congress passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to reign in
corruption.35
B. The U.S. Response to Corruption: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act consists of two general sections: one that
establishes record keeping and internal controls regulations and another that
prohibits bribery of foreign officials. While the FCPA was first passed in 1977,
amendments in 198836 and 1998 refined the Act and broadened its scope.
Comparison of the 1977 and 1998 versions reveals the United States has placed
greater and greater responsibilities on corporations.
1. The FCPA at the Time of its Passage
The first section of the FCPA creates record keeping and internal controls
standards. Since the Act's inception, this section has required issuers with
securities registered under the Securities and Exchange Acts to "make and keep
books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
31. DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: A GUIDE
FOR U.S. FIRMS DOING BUSINESS IN THE INTERNATIONAL MARKETPLACE 4 (2d ed. 1999).
32. Id. at 4-5; Peter W. Schroth, The United States and the International Bribery Conventions, 50
AM. J. COMP. L. 593, 595-96 (2002).
33. CRUVER, supra note 31, at 3.
34. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES AND DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT IMPROVED
DISCLOSURE ACTS OF 1977, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, S. REP. No. 95-114, at 4, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/1977sen.htm
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 95-114].
35. Pub L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2.
36. Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private Right of
Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185, 189-92 (1994). The 1988 amendments made several changes to the Act.
Some changes moderated the FCPA's anti-bribery restrictions, such as inclusion of an affirmative
defense allowing a corporation to avoid prosecution if its payments to a foreign official are allowed
under the written laws of that foreign official's country. Other amendments made the Act more
punitive, such as a significant fine increase. While these amendments are notable, this paper does not
discuss the 1988 amendments. Rather, this paper is concerned with the 1998 amendments, as those
amendments not only expanded the FCPA's scope more significantly, but also are the most recent
amendments and, as such, inform the trend towards imposing greater responsibilities upon corporations.
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reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer., 37 The Act
broadly defines records to include "accounts, correspondence, memorandums,
tapes, disks, paper, books, and other documents or transcribed information of any
type.... , Both qualitative omissions, such as omission of a questionable payment
to a foreign official, and qualitative omissions, such as mischaracterization of a
payment, are proscribed under the record keeping provision. 39  Since 1977, the
FCPA also has required issuers to "devise and maintain a system of internal
accounting controls" in order to improve corporate accountability and allow
corporate directors, officers, and shareholders to detect and prevent the unlawful
use of an issuer's assets. 40  An issuer violates this provision if it knowingly
circumvents or fails to implement a system of internal accounting controls.
4 1
The accounting and control provisions, one of the first federal laws to
mandate compliance with corporate governance standards, have allowed the SEC
to detect, investigate, and prosecute bribery.42 For example, in 1996 the SEC
brought an action against Montedison, an Italian industrial conglomerate whose
shares are traded domestically within the United States.43 The SEC alleged
Montedison violated the record keeping provision by disguising several hundred
million dollars in bribes to Italian politicians.44 Five years later Montedison settled
with the SEC, agreeing to pay a $300,000 fine.45 Similarly, in 1997 the SEC filed
a complaint against Triton Indonesia, a subsidiary of Triton Energy Corporation,
alleging it "failed to devise and maintain an adequate system of internal accounting
controls. '46 Triton agreed to a final judgment that enjoins it from violating the
FCPA and exacts a $300,000 fine. 47 More recently, the SEC issued a cease-and-
37. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(A); see also15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(7) (defming "reasonable detail" as
"such level of detail.., as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.").
38. 15 U.S.C. §78c(a)(37).
39. CRUVER, supra note 31, at 26-27.
40. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B). The Act specifically states that issuers must "provide reasonable
assurances that: (i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific
authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles...; and (iii) access to assets is permitted only
in accordance with management's general or specific authorization ......
41. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(5).
42. Schroth, supra note 32, at 599-601 (noting that these are the first laws requiring corporate
compliance with corporate governance standards, and giving the SEC the ability to regulate the internal
management of domestic corporations); see also H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 7, 9-16 (1998) (dubbing the FCPA "a
significant expansion of the SEC's regulatory authority over the internal management of public
corporations subject to the Commission's jurisdiction.").
43. SEC v. Montedison, Litigation Release No. 16948, Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Release No. 1380 (March 30, 2001) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl6948.htm.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., Litiation Release No. 15266, Accounting and Auditing
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desist order and levied a $100,000 fine against Chiquita Brands as a result of
internal control violations by its Colombian subsidiary, Banadex.48
While the record keeping and internal controls measures have helped to
combat bribery, the heart of the FCPA lies in its anti-bribery provisions. Since
1977, Congress has applied the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions to both "issuers'"
and "domestic concerns. 49  An issuer is any entity that must register under
Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act or that must file reports under
Section 15(d) of that Act. 50 Domestic concerns include U.S. nationals; a juridical
entity organized under U.S. law or with its principal place of business within the
United States; and any officer, agent, employee, or stockholder of a domestic
concern.5 1 Under this definition, a domestic concern employed by a foreign entity
or subsidiary is amenable to suit under the anti-bribery provisions while his or her
principal or employer is not.52
Although Congress expanded the FCPA in 1998, since 1977 Congress has
required the government to prove the same five, general elements to establish a
violation of the Act. First, the entity making a payment must act corruptly. 3
While the Act does not define the term "corruptly", the Eighth Circuit has stated
that, for purposes of the FCPA, a corrupt act is "intended to induce the recipient to
misuse his official position or to influence someone else to do so" or is "done
voluntarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose of accomplishing either an
unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or
means."
54
Second, the entity must use the mail or any other means of interstate
commerce in furtherance of an offer, payment, or promise to pay anything of
value. 55 Cases not involving the FCPA have held that, under the federal mail fraud
statute, a use of the mail that is merely "incident to an essential part of the scheme"
constitutes use of the mail.5 6 More directly, a United States citizen who traveled to
Nigeria with six gold watches intended as bribes for Nigerian officials made use of
interstate commerce. 7  These expansive definitions impose heightened
responsibilities upon corporations.
The third element the government must establish is an offer, payment, or
promise of value made to any foreign official, foreign political party, party official,
48. In re Chiquita Brands International, Inc., FCPA Civil Enforcement Actions by the Securities
and Exchange Commission at 3, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/append/ix/appendixb.pdf.
49. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
NoRMs 7 (ABA Publishing, 2005).
50. 15 U.S.C. §78dd-l(a).
51. DEMING, supra note 49, at 8-9.
52. Id. at 9.
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a).
54. United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991).
55. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
56. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 710-11 (1989).
57. Alder v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23419 (S.D. Cal. 1998), affirmed
219 F.3d 869, 878 (9th Cir. 2000).
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or foreign candidate for political office. 58 This element is satisfied if an issuer or
domestic concern knows that a portion of an offer, payment, or promise of value,
although not directly being used to bribe a foreign official, will be re-given or re-
promised to a foreign official, foreign political party, foreign party official, or
foreign candidate for political office. 59  Thus, this element imposes vicarious
liability on issuers and domestic concerns, holding issuers and domestic concerns
responsible for the acts of third parties who are not amenable to suit under the Act.
For purposes of vicarious liability, knowledge exists if an issuer or domestic
concern is aware a third party is committing bribery, firmly believes that bribery is
substantially certain to occur, or perceives a high probability that bribery will
occur. 60
Vicarious liability demands greater corporate responsibility; compels more
scrupulous oversight of a parent company's subsidiaries, agents, and affiliates; and
holds multinationals accountable when they fail to discharge their obligations. For
example, in 2004 the SEC lodged a complaint against Vetco Gray, Inc., a foreign
corporation traded publicly in the U.S. 61 The complaint alleged Vecto Gray was
vicariously liable for payments it made to its foreign subsidiaries because it knew
the subsidiaries used the payments to secure oil contracts in Nigeria, Angola, and
Kazakhstan through bribery.62 Vecto Gray agreed to a $5.9 million settlement the
day the SEC filed its complaint in Federal District Court.6 3 Similarly, if an issuer
or domestic concern makes a payment to a foreign sales agent while consciously
disregarding information suggesting the agent will use that money to make an
improper payment, the issuer or domestic concern likely has violated the Act's
vicarious liability provision.64
Since 1977, the fourth element of the anti-bribery regulations has required
payments to be made for the purpose of influencing an official act or decision;
inducing the official to do any act in violation of his lawful duty; or inducing an
official to use his power to affect a government act or decision.65 The issuer or
domestic concern need not offer payment for the purpose of influencing the foreign
official's own government. Rather, pursuant to the Act's broad language, if an
issuer or domestic concern pays a foreign official for the purpose of influencing
the U.S. government or a private enterprise, and if all other elements are met, that
payment would violate the Act.66
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(I)(2), 78dd-2(a)(1)(2).
59. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3).
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(h)(3), 78dd-2(h)(3).
61. SEC v. ABB Ltd, Complaint at 2, July 6, 2004, available at
http://sec.gov/litigation/complaints/comp 8775.pdf.
62. Id.
63. SEC Sues ABB Ltd. in Foreign Bribery Case, Litigation Release No. 18775, July 6, 2004,
available at http://sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl 8775.htm.
64. DEMING, supra note 49, at 33.
65. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
66. DEMING, supra note 49, at 14.
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Fifth, to establish a violation of the FCPA the government must prove the
issuer or domestic concern, in offering a payment, sought to obtain or retain
67business for any person. This sweeping language has made it easier to address
"the concern of Congress with the immorality, inefficiency, and unethical character
of bribery....6 Two cases illustrate this point. First, in SEC v. Monsanto, the
SEC concluded that Monsanto's authorization of $50,000 in illicit payments from
an Indonesian consulting firm to a senior Indonesian official, in exchange for
repeal of legislation that had adversely affected Monsanto's business, constituted a
payment offered to assist in obtaining business. 69 Similarly, in United States v.
Kay the Fifth Circuit stated that "Congress intended for the FCPA to apply broadly
to payments intended to assist the payor, either directly or indirectly, in obtaining
or retaining business for some person. 7 °  The court held that bribes paid to
customs officials in order to receive reduced customs and tax rates fall within the
Act's proscription if "the bribery was intended to produce an effect-here, through
tax savings-that would 'assist in obtaining or retaining business."'
71
2. The 1998 Amendments
In 1998, Congress amended the FCPA to conform to the OECD Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions (OECD Convention).72 The 1998 amendments broadened the Act's
jurisdiction and substance, permitting the government to investigate and prosecute
more acts of corruption. This enlargement reflects acknowledgement that deeper,
more extensive measures are necessary to regulate corporate activities, and
comports with the United States' and international community's pattern of placing
greater responsibilities upon multinational corporations.
The 1998 amendments made three important changes to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. First, the amendments greatly enlarged the Act's jurisdiction over
U.S. nationals and foreign persons. With regard to U.S. nationals, the Act added a
new subsection stating that:
"[i]t shall also be unlawful for any issuer organized under the laws of
the United States... or for any United States person that is an officer,
director, employee, or agent of such issuer or a stockholder thereof
acting on behalf of such issuer, to corruptly do any act outside the
United States in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or
authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to any of the
persons or entities set forth in paragraphs (1), (2), and (3) of...
subsection (a)... for the purposes set forth therein, irrespective of
67. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
68. U.S. v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir. 2004).
69. SEC v. Monsanto Company, SEC Sues Monsanto Company for Paying a Bribe, Litigation
Release No. 19023 (Jan. 6,2005) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr19023.htm.
70. Kay, supra note 68, at 755.
71. Id. at 756.
72. CRUVER, supra note 31, at 74.
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whether such issuer... officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder
makes use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce....'73 (emphasis added).
This subsection expands the FCPA's nationality jurisdiction. Now, the SEC
can investigate and prosecute issuers and persons acting on behalf of issuers
74
regardless of whether the mails or interstate commerce are used in any way.
Accordingly, if a corporate executive acting on behalf of an issuer, while in a
foreign county, orally offered to fly a foreign official and his family to Spain for
vacation in exchange for the foreign official's opposition to a new minimum wage
law, the executive's offer would violate the Act even though he neither made the
offer in the United States nor utilized the mail or interstate commerce.
The 1998 amendments also broadened the Act's jurisdiction over foreign
persons. Before 1998, foreign issuers organized under U.S. law were the only
foreign entities over whom the United States could assert jurisdiction.76 Since the
amendments, the U.S. can exercise jurisdiction over any person who violates the
Act while in U.S. territory.77 This expansion strengthens the SEC's ability to
combat corruption 78 and is consistent with the United States' and international
community's trend of placing greater responsibilities on corporations.
A recent SEC action against an Indonesian national illustrates the Act's
expanded jurisdiction. In 2001, the SEC and the Department of Justice filed a joint
civil injunction in U.S. District Court against KPMG Siddharta Siddharta &
Harsono (KPMG-SSH), an Indonesian accounting firm, and against Sonny
Harsono, a partner in the firm. 7 9 The complaint alleged Mr. Harsono agreed to pay
an Indonesian tax official $75,000 in order to reduce the official's tax assessment
against one of KPMG-SSH's clients.8 ° Soon after it initiated an action, the SEC
entered an uncontested final judgment against the defendants.81
The 1998 amendments also broadened the Act's substance in two important
ways. First, whereas the FCPA previously was limited to payments made for the
purpose of "influencing" or "inducing" an "act or decision," it now also proscribes
payments made for the purpose of "securing any improper advantage." 82 This
language captures more conduct than the 1977 version and helps to prevent false
claims that a corporation made payments for a legal purpose. For example,
payments made to have the first bid on a government contract, or to arrange a
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(g); see also 78dd-2(i), 78dd-3(a).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Pub L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494.
77. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3.
78. See Brown, supra note 42, at 19, 29-30.
79. United States & SEC v. KPMG Siddharta Siddharta & Harsono, Litigation Release No. 17127
(Sept. 12, 2001) available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/Ir17127.htm.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3)(A)(iii), 78dd-2(a)(3)(A)(iii), 78dd-3(a)(3)(A)(iii)
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favorable location for a factory, likely would be made for the purpose of "securing
any improper advantage" and violate the Act.83
Second, while the Act always has prohibited payments to foreign officials, the
1998 amendments expanded the definition of "foreign official" to include "any
officer or employee.., of a public international organization, or any person acting
in an official capacity or on behalf of any such... public international
organization." 84  By defining "foreign official" to include representatives of
international organizations, Congress has recognized that international
organizations play a vital role and their officials are susceptible to bribery.
C. International Anti-Corruption Measures
The international community has joined the fight against corruption. Over the
past ten years, several IGOs have implemented anti-bribery conventions. The
OECD, recognizing that "bribery... raises serious moral and political concerns,
undermines.., economic development, and distorts international competitive
conditions," drafted the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions 85 Likewise, the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption (IA Convention), ratified by thirty three Latin
American and Caribbean states, stresses that "fighting corruption strengthens
democratic institutions and prevents distortions in the economy. 86 The Council of
Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption (CoE Convention), ratified by
fifty two countries,87 and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UN
Convention), which one hundred forty countries have signed though only fifty one
have ratified, express similar concerns.88 Regulations in these conventions in
some ways exceed regulations in the FCPA.
Each of these conventions requires signatories to cooperate in fighting
corruption. The OECD Convention requires states to "provide prompt and
effective legal assistance" to one another.89 Signatories must cooperate with
criminal investigations, non-criminal investigations, and other proceedings that fall
within the scope of the Convention.9" The UN Convention and the IA Convention
incorporate similar duties. The UN Convention obliges states to furnish one
another with as much legal assistance as their domestic laws allow.9 Article XIV
of the IA Convention requires Parties to provide "mutual technical cooperation",
83. Id.
84. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f), 78dd-2(h)(2), 78dd-3(f).
85. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Business Transactions
pmbl., Dec. 18, 1997, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43, 37 I.L.M. 1 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
86. Inter-American Convention Against Corruption pmbl., Mar. 29, 1996, 35 1.L.M. 724
[hereinafter IA Convention].
87. Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Jan. 27, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 505
[hereinafter CoE Convention].
88. United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/4 (Oct.
31, 2003), reprinted in 43 I.L.M. 37 (2004), available at
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/index.html [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
89. OECD Convention, supra note 85, at art. 9.
90. Id.
91. U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at art. 46.
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which includes sharing knowledge of how to fight corruption most effectively,92
Collectively, these provisions demonstrate that countries worldwide are committed
to closely regulating multinationals' activities within their borders.
Each of these conventions also requires signatories to establish systems for
monitoring compliance. 93 OECD states must create "a programme of systematic
follow-up to monitor and promote full implementation of the Convention. 9 4 The
UN Convention creates a "Conference of the States Parties to the Convention,"
which must develop processes for reviewing compliance and exchanging ideas on
how to further the Convention's goals. 95 The CoE Convention simply requires
signatories to "monitor the implementation of th[e] Convention," while the
Follow-up on the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and its Program
for Cooperation require signatories to review compliance with the IA Convention
periodically. 96 These monitoring systems, absent from the FCPA, illustrate the
intemational community's commitment to fighting corruption and regulating
MNCs more closely.
D. Conclusion
Corruption undermines efficient business practices and wastes valuable
resources. Efforts to combat corruption have intensified gradually. The United
States first outlawed corporate bribery of foreign officials in 1977 with passage of
the FCPA. Since then, the U.S. has placed greater and greater anti-corruption
responsibilities on corporations, broadening the Act's jurisdiction and expanding
its substance. States worldwide have followed suit, adopting treaties which, in
some areas, exceed the FCPA's exacting standards. When the evolution of anti-
corruption measures is viewed in light of the development of heightened corporate
governance standards, and in light of events such as the rise of socialist-oriented
governments in Latin America and the passage of non-binding CSR measures, the
creation of a corporate social responsibility code appears on the horizon.
II. BEHIND SOX: REASONS FOR IMPOSING EVEN MORE CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY
At the start of the 2 1st century, broad corporate governance problems captured
the attention of the United States and the international community. Responses to
these problems, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and similar measures developed
by the United Kingdom and the European Union, established new corporate
governance and management systems, and placed greater responsibilities upon
corporations. Analysis of these corporate governance regulations, when viewed in
92. IA Convention, supra note 86, at art. XIV.
93. U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at art. 63; CoE Convention, supra note 87, at art. 24; OECD
Convention, supra note 85, at art. 12; Follow-up on the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption
and its Program for Cooperation AG/RES. 1784 (XXXI-O/01), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 244 (2002).
94. OECD Convention, supra note 85, at art. 12.
95. U.N. Convention, supra note 88, at art. 63.
96. CoE Convention, supra note 87, at art. 24; Follow-up on the Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption and its Program for Cooperation AG/RES. 1784 (XXXI-O/01), reprinted in 41
I.L.M. 244 (2002).
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light of the evolution of anti-corruption legislation, the rise of socialist-oriented
governments in Latin America, and the development of non-binding CSR
measures, reveals the international community is moving towards a binding CSR
code.
A. Broad Corporate Governance Problems
Corporate governance problems at the beginning of the twenty-first century
undermined democratic institutions and weakened confidence in the U.S.
economy. 97 While these problems varied in character and severity, combined they
contributed to investment losses, the closure of many businesses, and the
weakening of the U.S. and global economies. 98
The main corporate governance problem was deceitful accounting practices,
such as those employed by Enron and other corporations.99 While Enron grew
tremendously during the 1990s and early part of the twenty-first century, it
obtained much of its profits through fraudulently constructed transactions. 1°° To
improve its financial appearance to investors, Enron fabricated special purpose
entities that operated as partnerships with outside interests, allowing Enron to treat
them as independent entities, remove them from its consolidated balance sheet, and
hide losses. 101  Arthur Anderson, Enron's auditors, approved these "creative
compliance" techniques that were designed to impassion investors and deceive the
public. 0 2 Shortly after Enron filed for bankruptcy, investigations revealed these
entities were concealing $13.15 billion in debt and an additional $27 billion in
liabilities. 10 3 Enron's collapse was not an isolated incident. In 2002, WorldCom
admitted it had overstated its earnings by $11 billion and declared bankruptcy
while claiming $110 billion in assets, the largest bankruptcy in American
97. Justin O'Brien, Governing the Corporation: Regulation and Corporate Governance in an Age
of Scandal and Global Markets, in GOVERNING THE CORPORATION 3 (Justin O'Brien ed., 2005).
98. See J.R. Romanko, The Way We Live Now: 6-9-02: Salient Facts; Down from the Peaks, N.Y
TIMES, June 6, 2002, at 34 (citing an unemployment rate in April, 2002, of 6% compared to 3.9% in
April, 2000); Daniel Altman, U.S. Jobless Rate Increases to 6.4%, Highest in 9 Years, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 2003, at AI; Scott Bernard Nelson, Fed Holds Rates Steady - For Now Revises Stance, Calls U.S.
Economy Fragile, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 14, 2002, at DI (quoting the federal reserve as saying, "[t]he
softening in the growth of aggregate demand that emerged this spring has been prolonged in large
measure by weakness in financial markets and heightened uncertainty related to problems in corporate
reporting and governance.").
99. Enron Corporation began as a natural gas company, expanded its operations worldwide,
pressed into other industries, and was touted as a model for the new, competitive, corporate America.
100. DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE
AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 175-76 (Oxford University Press, 2005).
101. Peter T. Muchlinski, Enron and Beyond: Multinational Corporate Groups and the
Internationalization of Governance and Disclosure Regimes, 37 CONN. L. REV. 725, 730-31 (2005).
Enron's use and proliferation of SPEs grew out of SEC guidelines stating that corporations can treat
SPEs independently under accounting practices if an owner of a company that does business with the
SPE contributes an equity investment of at least 3% of the SPE's assets and if the independent owner
maintains control over the SPE.
102. Doreen McBamet, After Enron: Corporate Governance, Creative Compliance and the Uses of
Corporate Social Responsibility, in GOVERNING THE CORPORATION 209 (Justin O'Brien ed., 2005).
103. Jonathan Shirley, International Law and the Ramifications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
27 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 501, 502-03 (2004).
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history.' 0 4 Similar events unfolded at Global Crossing, a company that invested in
fiber optic cables and filed for bankruptcy in January, 2002 with billions of dollars
in assets and liabilities. 10 5  Authorities also uncovered hidden transactions and
veiled debts outside the balance sheet of Adelphia Inc., a prominent cable
company. 106
Another serious corporate governance problem for many corporations was
their auditor selection processes. Before SOX, a company's chief financial officer




However, most big accounting firms not only performed audits, but also earned
significant revenue through consulting. By 1998, Wall Street's major accounting
firms garnered only 38% of their revenue through audits.' 0 8  This change
practically transformed auditing firms into "consulting companies that did a little
auditing on the side,"' 1 9 in an arrangement that reposed considerable power in
CFOs. Whereas CFOs previously hesitated to discharge auditors who did not
approve certain corporate structures and transactions out of fear that discharge
would prompt closer analysis of accounts, concern among investors, and market
backlash, by the year 2000 CFOs could threaten to cut consulting business if
auditors refused to approve questionable transactions. 10  As auditors grew
reluctant to investigate suspect accounting practices, the balance of power shifted
heavily towards CFOs and their corporations.
A final corporate governance problem that has drawn attention in recent years
is vast increases in executive compensation. While CEOs of S&P 500 companies
earned thirty times more than non-managerial workers in 1970, by 1996 those
same CEOs were earning two hundred and ten times more than the average
worker, with the gap widening further in recent years."' The significance of these
figures does not lie in the sheer difference in pay. Rather, their importance also
stems from the fact that, unlike professional athletes, actors, and others whose
salaries also have grown considerably in recent years, CEOs "essentially set their
own compensation.""12
104. SKEEL, supra note 100, at 175-76.
105. Shirley, supra note 103, at 503-04.
106. Id. at 504.
107. SKEEL, supra note 100, at 179.
108. Id. at 166-67.
109. Id. (noting that in 2000 and 2001, Arthur Anderson, Enron's now defunct accounting firm,
earned $25 million a year from Enron for its consulting services and an additional $25 million for
audits).
110. Id.
111. Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 437, 440-41
(2003); David Leonhardt, The Imperial Chief Executive is Suddenly in the Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES,
June 24, 2002, at Al (stating that top CEOs made approximately 410 times what the average worker
was paid in 2001); Ken Belson, Executive Pay: A Special Report; Learning How to Talk About Salary
in Japan, N.Y. TIMES, April 7, 2002, at 12 (highlighting that executives in Japan make approximately
12 times what the average worker is paid in Japan, whereas executives in the United States made
approximately 180 times what the average worker is paid in the U.S.).
112. Stephen M. Bainbride, Book Note, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1619 (2005) (reviewing LUCIAN
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE
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These practices prompted close scrutiny of corporate activities, undermined
confidence in corporations, and hurt corporate earnings. As concerns grew,
corporate ills damaged private citizens and the economy." 3 In July 2002, as the
negative impacts of poor corporate governance were spreading across the United
States, "14 Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act "to address the systemic and
structural weaknesses affecting our capital markets which were revealed by
repeated failures.., in recent months and years," and "[to] increase corporate
responsibility."' 15
B. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: A New Code of Corporate Responsibility
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been heralded as "the most significant piece of
securities legislation since the 1930s. ' ' 116 It has redefined the rules for publicly
traded companies, instituting sweeping changes in corporate governance and
accounting practices. 117  More specifically, auditor controls, certification
procedures, and internal controls requirements have placed greater responsibilities
on corporations." 8
One way SOX has tightened oversight of corporations is through stricter
regulation of audit committees. Until recently, most audit committees convened
COMPENSATION (2004)).
113. See Brian Kim, Sarbanes Oxley Act, 40 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 235, 237 (2003) (noting that
twenty thousand Enron executives lost $1.2 billion from their 401(k) plans during Enron's dissolution);
John Paul Lucci, Enron: The Bankruptcy Heard Around the World and the International Ricochet of
Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 212 (2003) ("[flinancial scandals involving WorldCom, Qwest,
Global Crossing, Tyco, and Enron ultimately cost shareholders $460 billion."); Ethan G. Zelizer, The
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Accounting for Corporate Corruption?, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REv. 27, 30 (2002)
(stating that WorldCom's accounting and governance problems resulted in the loss of 20,000 jobs); see
also SEN, supra note 16, at 94 (explaining that unemployment's negative effects spread far beyond loss
of income).
114. See Romanko, supra note 98 at 34 (citing an unemployment rate in April, 2002, of 6%
compared to 3.9% in April, 2000); Altman, supra note 98, at Al; Nelson, supra note 98, at D1 (quoting
the federal reserve as saying "[T]he softening in the growth of aggregate demand that emerged this
spring has been prolonged in large measure by weakness in financial markets and heightened
uncertainty related to problems in corporate reporting and govemance.").
115. S. REP. No. 107-205 (2002).
116. SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY
ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A
PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm#2.
117. ROBERT R. MOELLER, SARBANES-OXLEY AND THE NEW INTERNAL AUDITING RULES 3
(2004).
118. See THOMAS E. HARTMAN, THE COST OF BEING PUBLIC IN THE ERA OF SARBANES-OXLEY 3
(2006) (discussing a survey of corporate executives which reveals that a large majority of executives
regard SOX's corporate governance and public disclosure reforms as "too strict", as companies with an
annual revenue under $1 billion experienced a 174% increase in "the cost of being public" from 2001-
2005); Jonathan Treadway, New Regulations Affecting the Banking Industry: Problems with Potential
Application of Selected Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to Small, Non-Public Banking
Organizations, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 165, 183 (2004) (describing how many small banking firms have
decided not to go public because of the extra expenses that accompany SOX's pervasive regulations);
William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of "Going Private ", 55
EMORY L.J. 141, 141 (2005) (stating that section 404 compliance cost an average of $823,200 in 2004).
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infrequently and merely rubber stamped the auditor's work.1 19 Many audit
committee members even appeared personally tied to their companies' CEOs.1
20
Sarbanes-Oxley changed this relationship by requiring corporations to develop
independent audit committees. 121 Now, under Section 301, audit committee
members cannot hold any position within a company other than their position as a
member of the audit committee. 122 Likewise, audit committee members may not
"accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer" nor
"be an affiliated person of the issuer" or its subsidiaries. 123 Each audit committee
has plenary responsibility for appointing, overseeing, and setting compensation for
its corporation's public accounting firm. 124 Also, each audit committee must craft
a procedure for funneling employees' complaints of questionable accounting
practices to corporate officers. 125 Furthermore, each audit committee must have at
least one "financial expert," or explain its reasons for not doing so. 126
In addition, Section 201 of SOX prohibits external auditors from providing
additional, non-audit services, including bookkeeping, financial information
systems design, appraisals, investment advice, and "any other service that the
Board determines, by regulation, is impermissible."' 127 Collectively, Sections 201
and 301 create a new corporate governance framework and place new
responsibilities on corporations.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's certification provision also tightens regulation of
corporations. This provision requires each issuer's principal executive and
principal financial officer(s) to certify that he or she has reviewed each annual or
quarterly report and that, based on the officer's knowledge, all material facts in the
report are true, no material facts are omitted, and all financial information is
correct "in all material respects."' 128 By forcing corporate officers to certify their
corporation's financial condition, this provision undercuts an executive's ability to
claim ignorance of faulty financial statements and exacts greater corporate
responsibility.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act's internal controls provisions impose SOX's
deepest, most comprehensive regulations. 129  Pursuant to Section 302, each
119. MOELLER, supra note 117, at 59.
120. Id. at 59.
121. Roberta S. Karmel, The Securities and Exchange Commission Goes Abroad To Regulate
Corporate Governance, 33 STETSON L. REV. 849, 873 (2004).
122. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745, 776 § 301 (2002) (codified
in scattered sections of 1, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.A.) [hereinafter SOX].
123. Id. at 776, § 301.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 790, § 407. To qualify as a financial expert one must have experience auditing
"comparable issuers", "experience with internal accounting controls", and "an understanding of audit
committee functions."
127. Id. at 771-72, § 201.
128. Id. at 777, § 302.
129. See 68 Fed. Reg. 36636 (June 18, 2003) (defining internal controls as "a process designed by,
or under the supervision of ... principal executive and financial officers . . .and effected by the ...
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principal executive and principal financial officer must confirm that he or she has
designed internal controls. 130 These controls must ensure the principal executives
and principal officers know material financial information about the corporation
and its subsidiaries. 13 1  Principal executives and principal officers also must
confirm they have evaluated the effectiveness of these controls. 132 In addition,
Section 302 requires each principal executive and principal officer to confirm that
any significant cause for alarm over the adequacy of the controls has been
disclosed. 133
In addition, pursuant to Section 404, corporate management must: 1) state in
their annual reports management's responsibility for "establishing and maintaining
an adequate internal control structure;" 2) assess the effectiveness of the internal
controls in their annual reports; and 3) have their public accounting fnns "attest to,
and report on" management's assessment. 134
Comparison of the FCPA's and SOX's internal controls provisions reveals the
trend towards placing greater responsibilities on corporations. The FCPA's internal
controls provisions, initially drafted thirty years ago, simply declare that issuers
must design and maintain internal controls, but does not require evaluation or
analysis. 135 Conversely, sections 302 and 404 of SOX together require corporate
executives to state their responsibility for designing internal controls, to create
such controls, to assess and evaluate these controls, and to draw conclusions about
their effectiveness. 136 While the FCPA places responsibility for internal controls
upon the corporation in general, 137 SOX specifically charges executive officers
with internal controls duties. 138  Thus, internal controls have been transformed
from a recitation of general duties lodged upon the corporation as a whole to a
statement of specific duties 139 imposed on corporate executives in particular.
Although the audit committee, certification, and internal controls provisions
have placed the greatest responsibilities on corporations, other sections of SOX
have had a similar effect. An ethics provision requires corporations to "disclose
whether or not, and if not, the reason therefor," they have "adopted a code of ethics
board of directors ... to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and
the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles... ").
130. SOX at 777, § 302.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id; see also Final Rule: Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual
Reports, Securities Act and Exchange Release Nos. 33-8124, 34-46427, IC-25722, 67 Fed. Reg. 57,726
(Aug. 29, 2002) (specifying that CEOs and CFOs may not delegate their Section 302 duties to any
subordinate).
134. SOX at 789, § 404.
135. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B).
136. SOX at 777, § 301; SOX at 789 § 404.
137. 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2)(B).
138. SOX at 777, § 301; SOX at 789 § 404.
139. See 68 Fed Reg. 36636 (adopting rules for the implementation of Section 404).
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for senior financial officers." 140 In addition, pursuant to section 402, corporations
no longer may "extend or maintain credit... in the form of a personal loan to... any
director or executive officer," even if done indirectly through a subsidiary. '
4 ' This
proscription creates new corporate responsibilities. Finally, Section 806 of
Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits corporations and their constituents from discharging,
demoting, suspending, harassing, threatening, or otherwise discriminating against
any employee who informs the government of corporate conduct that may violate
an SEC regulation or a federal law involving fraud against shareholders. This
section also provides civil remedies to employees who allege discrimination and
subsequently are sued by their employer, 42 federalizing state statutes protecting
whistle blowers."4 3  Section 806 shifts power from the corporation to its
constituents, a change that is consistent with calls for corporations to assume a new
set of corporate social responsibilities to their employees, communities, and
environments.
C. Corporate Governance Measures in Other Countries
Two years after enactment of SOX, the United Kingdom and the European
Union passed new corporate governance measures. These regulations, consistent
with U.S. regulations, impose greater responsibilities upon corporations.
The United Kingdom's Companies (Audit, Investigation, and Enterprise) Act
of 2004 (the Companies Act) severs close ties between corporations and auditing
firms.'44 Although it does not forbid auditors from performing non-audit services
like section 201 of SOX, it does empower the Secretary of State to pass regulations
requiring corporations to disclose auditors' non-audit services. 14' The Companies
Act also gives auditors unfettered access to company accounts, and allows them to
require corporate executives to provide them with any information needed to
perform their duties 146 In addition, pursuant to the Companies Act's certification
provision, each corporate director must state in his director's report that, "so far as
[he] is aware, there is no relevant audit information of which the company's
auditors are unaware." The director also must certify he has taken all measures
necessary for making himself "aware of any relevant audit information" and for
establishing "that the company's auditors are aware of [such] information."
147
Other provisions set criteria for recognizing supervisory audit bodies, permit the
Secretary of State to make grants to entities that issue accounting standards or
investigate departures from accounting standards, and, with approval by the
140. SOX at 789, § 406; see also MOELLER, supra note 117, at 71-79 (discussing the efforts of
many corporations to establish corporate wide ethics programs in order to increase external legitimacy,
the risk environments that corporations face, the need for an ethics program, and how to establish such a
program).
141. SOX at 787, § 402.
142. Id. at § 806.
143. Karmel, supra note 121, at 867.
144. Companies (Audit, Investigations, and Community Enterprise) Act of 2004, art. 7, available at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/acts2004/40027--b.htm#7 [hereinafter Companies Act].
145. Id.
146. Id. atart. 8.
147. Id. at art. 9.
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Secretary of State, empower individual investigators to compel the production of
documents during investigations. 14
8
The European Union also has adopted measures that place greater
responsibilities on corporations. EU Council Directive 2006/43 (the Directive)
includes several provisions affirming that auditors must operate independently of
their employers. Member States must prohibit auditors from auditing companies
with whom they have "any direct or indirect financial, business, employment or
other relationship."'149 Also, owners and shareholders may not intervene "in the
execution of a statutory audit in any way which jeopardises the independence and
objectivity of the statutory auditor." 150 In addition, the Directive requires member
states to "ensure that all statutory auditors and audit firms are subject to a system
of quality assurance" that operates independent of the auditors and audit firms.
Section 101 of SOX establishes a non-profit organization, the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board, "to oversee audit of public companies... in
order to protect the interests of investors ... ,,151 The Directive mandates the
creation of a similar body. It calls for "a system of public oversight for statutory
auditors and audit firms," which will "apply to all statutory auditors and audit
firms" and "have ultimate responsibility for.., the approval and registration of
statutory auditors and audit firms, the adoption of standards on professional
ethics... and.., investigative and disciplinary systems."r 1 5 2 By adopting these
measures, the EU has followed the lead of the United States in placing greater
responsibilities upon corporations.
D. Conclusion: Continued Progressive Placement of Heightened Responsibilities
upon Corporations
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in response to corporate governance
problems that arose in the United States during recent years. SOX tightens
corporate structures, strengthens corporate governance, and places greater
responsibilities on corporations than does the FCPA. Thus, U.S. regulation of
corporate activities has escalated gradually and a similar trend exists
internationally. Although less prescriptive than SOX, the Companies Act and the
Directive also create new corporate governance standards. This evolution of
placing greater responsibilities on corporations, when viewed in light of events
such as the rise of socialist- oriented governments in Latin America, corporate
rights abuses, and the passage of non-binding CSR codes, suggests the
international community will develop a binding CSR code to govern the social
impacts of corporate activities.
148. Id. at arts. 1, 16,21.
149. Council Directive 2006/43, art. 22, 2006 O.J. (L 157) 87 (EC).
150. Id. at art. 24.
151. SOXat750,§ 101.
152. Council Directive 2006/43, supra note 149, at art. 32.
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III. THE GROWTH OF SOCIALIST-ORIENTED GOVERNMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA
Following a wave of democratization in Latin America during the 1980s,
many countries in Latin America adopted neoliberal economic policies.
153
Neoliberal policies reduce a country's economic protections and open its economy
to the international marketplace with minimal government interference. 154 Such
policies were recommended for developing countries by the International
Monetary Fund, World Bank, and other leading international economic institutions
during the 1990s. 155 In many cases, these institutions conditioned loans and
assistance on countries' willingness to adopt austere macroeconomic fiscal
policies, rapidly privatize state-owned businesses, and quickly liberalize capital
markets. 15 6 Many Latin American countries followed these neoliberal mandates,
curtailing social services,157 removing restraints from capital markets, 158 and
privatizing huge, state-owned industries. 1
59
These measures succeeded for several years and helped to produce economic
growth throughout Latin America. 160  Corporations invested heavily in Latin
America during the 1990s. In 1990, inward FDI to Latin American countries
totaled just over $10 billion. 16' Ten years later, inward FDI had jumped to $114
billion. 162 This spread of foreign corporations was partly attributable to neoliberal
reforms, particularly rapid privatization of many state-run industries. 163 In Brazil,
for example, over one hundred state-owned companies with a value of $61.5
billion were privatized during the 1990s. 164 Similarly, one hundred companies
with a value of approximately $23 billion were privatized in Argentina during the
1990s.165
153. THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 59 (2d ed., 1989)
(highlighting the election of civilian presidents in Peru, Argentina, and Brazil during the 1980s and
citing Chile as the only "major exception" to the general rule that Latin America had democratized by
1985).
154. STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 6-8, 74.
155. Id. at 6-8.
156. Id., at 53.
157. Sergio Cabrera Morales, Las Noventa: Hacia la Segunda Dcada Perdida, IN
GLOBALIZACION, EXCLUSION Y DEMOCRACIA EN AMlRICA LATINA 169-170 (Heinz Dieterich ed.,
1997).
158. AUGUSTO DE LA TORRE ET AL., CAPITAL MARKET DEVELOPMENT: WHITHER LATIN AMERICA
8, 18 (2006), available at http://www.nber.org/books/lASE05/delatorre-et-a15-23-06.pdf
159. SYBIL RHODES, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND FREE-MARKET CAPITALISM IN LATIN AMERICA 26-
29 (2006) (discussing the rapid privatization of state-owned businesses, particularly the
telecommunications industry, in Latin America during the 1990s).
160. See STIGLITZ, supra note 3, at 53 (stating that neoliberal policies initially sparked growth in
Latin America); Gross Domestic Product by Host Region and Economy (1970-2005), in UNITED
NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005:
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D (2005).
161. Inward FDI Flows by Host Region and Economy (1970-2005), supra note 5.
162. Id.
163. Germano Mendes de Paula et al., Economic Liberalization and Changes in Corporate Control
in Latin America, 44 THE DEVELOPING ECONS. 467, 485-87 (2002).
164. Id. at 477-78.
165. Id.
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However, soon after neoliberal policies produced growth in Latin America,
they began to fail. The neoliberal prescription of cutting social spending in order
to maintain macroeconomic health destroyed the social service infrastructures of
many countries.' 66 By the end of the 1990s, sluggish and in many cases negative
economic growth had spread throughout the area. 167  Neoliberal reforms and
extensive FDI received some blame for this economic downturn, 16  enabling
leaders who espoused socialist-oriented policies to assume power in Latin
America. 169 This trend began with the election of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela in
1999, and since has spread to eight countries in Central and South America.
170
The degree to which these countries follow socialist policies and values differs
greatly.' 7 1  However, each has adopted SO policies that show their interest in
countering perceived U.S. dominance in the region, protecting workers' rights,
safeguarding national resources, and maintaining control over their economies.1
7 2
Venezuela elected Hugo Chavez as President in 1999.173 Since taking office,
Chavez has spent billions of dollars on education and health care, and has made
"life increasingly miserable for foreign - above all American - companies." 174
Most recently, Chavez announced plans to nationalize Venezuela's
telecommunications and electricity industries, and to transform Venezuela into a
socialist country. 175 Venezuela generally is considered the most SO country in
166. Anthony Hall, From Fome Zero to Bolsa Familia, Social Policies and Poverty Alleviation
Under Lula, 38 J. LATIN AMER. STUDIES 689 (2006).
167. See Latin Focus Consensus Forcast, available at: http://www.latin-
focus.com/latinfocus/countries (showing statistics indicating that GDP failed to grow in Brazil between
1995 and 2002; Argentina's economy was stagnant during 2001 and, during the first quarter of 2002, its
annual economic growth rate declined 16%; and between the middle of 1998 and the middle of 1999,
Venezuela went from experiencing moderately positive to moderately negative economic growth, and
by 2003 was experiencing sharp negative growth before its economy recovered).
168. Francisco Panizza, Unarmed Utopia Revisited: The Resurgence of Left-of-Centre Politics in
Latin America, 53 POL. STUD. 716, 727 (2005); Jorge Castafieda, Latin America's Left Turn, 85:3
FOREIGN AFF. 28 (2006).
169. Consider that Hugo Chavez was elected President of Venezuela shortly after the country went
from experiencing moderately positive to moderately negative economic growth; that Luiz Inhcio Lula
da Silva was elected President of Brazil after a 7 year period during which, after rising and then falling,
Brazil's GDP remained constant; and that Argentina elected Nestor Kirchner after it experienced
economic collapse.
170. Castafieda, supra note 168; Chris Kraul, Ecuador's New President Targets Foreign Debt
Relief L.A, TIMES, Jan. 16, 2007, at A6.
171. See generally Castafieda, supra note 168.
172. Panizza, supra note 168, at 727.
173. While this article is concerned with economic and social rights in Venezuela since Chavez
came to power, rather than with political rights, it is important to note Venezuela has been criticized by
states and international organizations, including the Organization of American States, for depriving
people of their liberty, condoning extra-judicial killings, and generally failing to protect political rights.
See IACHR, Press Release: IACHR Reports on the Situation of Human Rights at the Conclusion of Its
Session, No. 35/05, Oct. 28, 2005.
174. See Christian Parenti, Hugo Chavez and Petro Populism, NATION, Apr. 11, 2005, at 17
(stating Venezuela has spent billions on social programs that have taught 1.3 million people to read,
provided medical care to millions, and improved infrastructure); Castafieda, supra note 168.
175. Simon Romero, Chavez Begins New Term Vowing Socialism, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2007, at
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Latin America; Jorge Castafieda, the Foreign Minister of Mexico under President
Vicente Fox and current professor at New York University, has called Chavez a
populist leader who "does very little for the poor of his own country, 176 and who
pursues "big-time spending, authoritarian governance and militant anti-
Americanism."' 177  However, if Chavez moderates his stance and redirects his
focus on protecting social and economic rights towards development of a CSR
code, a change which seems more likely since Venezuelans rejected a referendum
that would have given Chavez greater constitutional powers, he could wield
tremendous influence in the region. Such pragmatism would advance efforts
toward placing social responsibilities upon corporations.
Luiz In~cio Lula da Silva was elected President of Brazil in 2002, the first
left-wing Brazilian president since 1970.178 Lula has developed socialist policies
"without rejecting the precepts of capitalism." 179  Local-level councils provide
input that shape his party's national agenda, and his government supports the
Landless Rural Worker's Movement, the world's largest movement of rural poor
and a strong advocate of agrarian reform. Lula also has weakened ties with the
United States and strengthened ties with other developing countries such as China,
India, and South Africa, hoping to counter U.S. influence in the region." 0 Thus,
although Brazil follows capitalist ideology, its government also is concerned with
protecting its citizens' social rights and projecting its socialist perspective into the
international community. 18  Because a CSR code would help Brazil's government
achieve these goals, Lula's rise strengthens the likelihood that the international
community will develop a code of corporate social responsibility.
Nestor Kirchner was elected President of Argentina in 2002, following the
former president's resignation in 2001 and the country's economic collapse.'
82
Kirchner initially challenged the IMF, stating that foreign investors would receive
only a small portion of the debt Argentina owed them because he wanted to
conserve funds for social programs. 183  Kirchner later changed his position,
announcing Argentina would pay its debt early, and, in January 2006, made the
A16.
176. See Castafieda, supra note 168.
177. Jorge G. Castafieda, Good Neighbor Policy, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2006, at A3 1.
178. Panizza, supra note 168, at 716.
179. The Region's Leftward Shift: Identifying, Denying, and Interpreting Divisions, LATIN AM.
WKLY REP., Jan. 31, 2006.
180. Kenneth Rapoza, Brazil Moves to Form "Bloc" Against U.S.: Seeks "South-South"
Cooperation, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 4, 2003, at A15.
181. See Simon Romero, Brazil's Objections Slow Chavez's Plans for Regional Bank, N.Y. TIMES,
July 22, 2007, at A12 (noting that Brazil has sought to diminish the clout of a Bank of the South, and
calling Lula a "longtime socialist who embraced market friendly policies once in power... "); Hall,
supra note 166 (discussing how Brazil's enthusiasm for social safety nets has followed the failure of
neoliberal policies and the accompanying destruction of social infrastructure).
182. Panizza, supra note 168, at 717.
183. Colin McMahon, Tension Builds as Argentina Tries to Renegotiate its Defaulted Debt, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 1, 2004; Todd Benson, Argentina Starting Drive to Emerge from Fault, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
12, 2005, at C4.
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country's last payment. 184 Argentina's debt payment showed its willingness to
work within the existing international economic system and pleased foreign
investors. However, Argentina is wary of neoliberal dictates, opposes a free-trade
agreement, and in some instances has aligned closely with Venezuela.'1 5 Thus,
Argentina accepts that foreign investment is necessary for long-term economic
growth, though it also questions and challenges the neoliberal agenda. The new
President of Argentina, Cristina Kirchner, has continued many of the same policies
that her husband developed. Because a CSR code could protect Argentines from
the activities of MNCs and soften neoliberal policies, the election of Kirchner's
government strengthens the likelihood that Argentina will endorse and the
international community will develop a CSR code.
Bolivia recently elected Evo Morales as President. During his campaign,
Morales promised to depart from twenty years of neoliberal reforms that failed to
pull Bolivia from poverty, and to turn towards socialist-oriented policies.' 18 6 Since
taking office, Morales has nationalized Bolivia's oil and gas industry, ordering
troops to occupy foreign-run fields.' 87 Morales has indicated he may nationalize
other sectors as well, such as the mining and forest industries. 88 An Amyara
Indian and past leader of the coca union, Morales also has championed the rights
of the poor and of indigenous people. He has declared that coca, widely used in
Bolivia as a mild medicinal herb, should be treated as a legitimate product, rather
than as an illicit drug. He also has fought multinationals' exploitation of Bolivia's
natural resources. 189 Bolivia's ratification of a CSR code that governs the conduct
of MNCs operating within its borders would further its socialist objectives while
providing it with foreign investment. Accordingly, the election of Morales furthers
the likelihood that developed states, developing states, and multinationals will
adopt a CSR code.
Other countries in Central and South America also have elected SO leaders in
recent years. Ecuador's recently elected president, Rafael Correa, has challenged
foreign corporate interests and supported socialist-oriented policies. 190  For
184. Larry Rohter, As Argentina's Debt Dwindles, President's Power Grows Steadily, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 3, 2006, at Al; Colon McMahon, For Argentina, Debt Cut is Payback Time, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 13,
2006, at C5.
185. Moises Naim, The Lost Continent, 157 FOREIGN POL'Y, 40 (2006).
186. Daphne Eviatar, Liberating Pachamama: Corporate Greed, Bolivia, and Peasant Resistance,
38:2 DISSENT 22, 25 (2006); MARK WEISBRODT & LUIs SANDOVAL, BOLIVIA'S CHALLENGES 6 (2006)
(stating that Bolivia is South America's poorest country, with an average per capita income of $2,800 as
compared to an average of $8,200 in all of Latin America, with 64% of Bolivians living below the
poverty line).
187. Hector E. Schamis, Populism, Socialism, and Democratic Institutions, 17:4 J. OF DEMOCRACY
20, 32 (2006).
188. Tyler Bridges, Farmers' Fears Highlight Growing Rift with Morales, MIAMI HERALD, June
14, 2006 (noting that foreign mining companies, such as Apex Silver, Coeur d'Alne and Newmont,
together have invested $750 million in Bolivia, at least part of which they stand to lose upon
nationalization.
189. Eviatar, supra note 186, at 26-27.
190. Chris Kraul, Ecuador's New President Targets Foreign Debt Relief L.A. TIMES, Jan. 16,
2007, at A6.
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example, a recent election for Ecuador's constituent assembly gave Correa "a clear
mandate to write a new constitution reflecting '21' century socialism,"'' and
Correa opposes a free trade agreement with the United States. 192 In November,
2006, Nicaragua elected Daniel Ortega, an SO politician, leader of the communist
Sandinista National Liberation Front during the 1980's, and former president of the
county, as its new President. 193 Peru, Chile, and Uruguay also have elected centre-
left leaders over the past few years. 194 The election of these governments should
further efforts to develop a CSR code.
Leaders critical of neoliberal prescriptions and supportive of SO policies have
come to power in Latin America over the past decade. To varying degrees, they
have pursued policies that benefit lower classes and workers, have protected their
domestic industries from the influence of foreign MNCs and, in some cases, have
nationalized major sectors of their economies. Their efforts to combat the harms
that have accompanied the growth of FDI and spread of MNCs in Latin America
are consistent with the goals of a CSR code. Accordingly, the rise of SO
governments in Latin America, when viewed in light of the trend towards placing
greater responsibilities upon corporations, and in light of the adoption of non-
binding CSR codes by IGOS and MNCs, should advance development of a code of
corporate social responsibility.
IV. CORPORATE ABUSES OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS, THE FAILURE OF THE
RULE OF LAW, AND NON-BINDING CSR MEASURES AS MEANS OF PROTECTING
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS
Multinational corporations have been accused of committing human rights
abuses on various occasions and in various countries over the past decade. The
international community has drafted several non-binding corporate human rights
obligations to address these abuses. Likewise, MNCs voluntarily have drafted and
adopted non-binding codes of social conduct. These measures demonstrate that
states and corporations worldwide understand that the absence of an enforceable
regulatory framework for MNCs has created problems. Even more importantly,
these measures show states are willing to place social responsibilities on MNCs,
and MNCs are willing to accept such obligations.
A. Concerns Over Rights Abuses and the Failure of the Rule of Law
Multinational corporations have been accused of violating civil and political
rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; and environmental rights. For
example, it was alleged that U.S. parent company Unocal and its French subsidiary
191. Ecuador: Correa's Victory, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 2007.
192. Correa Plans Many Changes: Ecuador is Not Anti-American, New Leader Says, S. FLORIDA
SUN SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2007 at 25A.
193. Adam Thompson, Long Road Back to Power, FIN. TIMES Jan. 8, 2007, at 32.
194. Latin America, 2006, WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at A12 (noting that both Michelle
Bachelet, who recently was elected President of Chile, and Alan Garcia, who was elected as President
of Peru, have pursued free-trade agreements with the United States); Castaneda, supra note 168 (noting
that Tabare Vazquez, who was elected President of Uruguay in 2004, has both denounced neoliberalism
and explored the possibility of a free-trade agreement with the United States).
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knew the Burmese government was using slave labor, raping women, confiscating
property, and uprooting communities in order to assist Unocal's construction of a
gas pipeline.1 95 Local forces in Nigeria hired by Shell carried out large-scale,
extra-judicial killings and destroyed villages in order to secure Shell's investment
in the country. 196 In India, Dabhol Power Corporation (majority owned by Enron)
hired police forces who arbitrarily detained non-violent protestors. 197 A
subcontractor of the Gap in El Salvador employed workers in sweatshop
conditions. 198 British Petroleum admitted to hiring Columbia's military to protect
its oil operations in the country, with disregard for whether the military also would
protect basic human rights. 199 Children worldwide are engaged in labor.20 0 Most
recently, Blackwater USA has been accused of opening fire without provocation
while providing private security services in Iraq, killing 17 citizens. 20 1 Other
violations include exposing workers to sulfur dioxide in Peru and dumping waste
into the waters of Ecuador and Indonesia.2 °2 These are not isolated instances of
misconduct, but rather samples drawn from a larger pool of human rights
violations. However, at the present only states, and in a few instances individuals,
203are treated as having human rights obligations.
B. Intergovernmental Organizations' Non-binding Corporate Social
Responsibility Measures
Concern over human rights abuses associated with corporate activities has
prompted states to develop non-binding CSR codes. The stakeholder governance
style of European companies, under which corporations consider relationships
with employees, consumers, and the environment when making decisions, has
made Europe a natural leader in this process.20 4 In 1999, the European Parliament
adopted a "Code of conduct for European enterprises in developing countries" (the
Code).20 5 While the Code does not establish specific, binding corporate social
responsibilities, it does erect the foundation for enforceable regulations. The Code
195. Hall, supra note 16, at 416-17.
196. Cassel, supra note 16, at 1965-68.
197. Glen Kelley, Multilateral Investment Treaties: A Balanced Approach to Multinational
Corporations, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 483, 513-14 (2000).
198. Cassel, supra note 16, at 1968-69.
199. Stephens, supra note 1, at 52.
200. James J. Silk & Meron Makonnen, Economic Exploitation of Children: A Role for
International Human Rights Law?, ST. Louis U. PUBLIC L. REv. 359, 359 (2003).
201. John M. Broder, State Dept. Plans Tighter Control of Security Firm, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 6,
2007, at Al.
202. Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational Corporations Under
United States Law: Concepts and Procedural Problems, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 493, 514-16 (2002);
Stephens, supra note 1, at 53.
203. Ratner, supra note 19, at 462-65.
204. Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the Anglo-
American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 493, 498 (2005). Europe's stakeholder
governance orientation is in contrast to the shareholder orientation U.S. companies follow, which
centers on maximizing shareholder wealth.
205. Resolution on EU Standards for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries:
Towards a European Code of Conduct, 1999 O.J. (C 104) 180 [herereinafter EU Code].
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recommends the EU endorse "existing minimum applicable international
standards" the ILO, UN, and OECD have set for regulating the social impacts of
corporate activities, and calls on the EU to work with these organizations "to
ensure more powerful and effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. 20 6
Provisions also stress that an EU CSR code should protect the rights of indigenous
peoples and create social labels for products.2 °7 A paper the Commission of
European Communities issued in 2001 (the Green Paper) supplements the Code,
declaring that "[c]orporate social responsibility should... not... substitute for
social rights or environmental standards, including the development of new...
legislation.9
20 8
The United States also has adopted non-binding measures that place greater
social responsibilities on corporations. It recently signed the Voluntary Principles
on Security and Human Rights (the Voluntary Principles) with the United
Kingdom. The Voluntary Principles establish high CSR standards for businesses
in the extractive and energy sectors and tout the constructive role businesses can
play in protecting social rights.20 9 The Voluntary Principles ask businesses in the
extractive and energy sectors to establish procedures for assessing the risk that the
corporation, its agents, or its host country might commit a human rights violation;
to ensure that public security forces the government provides for the corporation's
benefit do not commit human rights violations; and to "record and report any
credible allegations of human rights abuses by public security in their areas of
operation to appropriate host government authorities. 21 °
More recently, in response to allegations that Blackwater USA opened fire
without provocation while providing private security services in Iraq, killing 17
citizens, the U.S. State Department announced new policies that would ensure
tighter control of the company. According to these measures, State Department
monitors must accompany all Blackwater convoys in and around Baghdad, all
Blackwater vehicles must be equipped with State Department video cameras, and
recordings of all radio transmissions between Blackwater convoys and military and
civilian agencies supervising those convoys in Iraq must be saved.211
Intergovernmental organizations also have begun to develop non-binding
CSR codes. Every OECD country plus nine non-member countries have signed
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporations (the Guidelines). The
Guidelines encourage corporations to voluntarily adopt certain standards. They
suggest that "enterprises should.., respect the human rights of those affected by
their activities consistent with the host government's international obligations and
206. Id. at arts. 12, 29. Relevant standards cover human rights, labor, and the environment.
207. Id. at arts. 7, 12, 14.
208. Green Paper: Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility, at 22,
COM (201) 366 final [hereinafter Green Paper].
209. U.S. Department of State Fact Sheet, Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights
(Feb. 20, 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/2931 .htm [hereinafter Voluntary Principles].
210. Id.
211. Broder, supra note 201.
2007
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
commitments. 212 Enterprises also should "[r]espect" employees' freedom to join
trade unions, "[c]ontribute" to the "abolition of child labor", and end workplace
discrimination.2 13 Other terms enounce high environmental, corruption, and
consumer protection standards that corporations should follow.
214
In two separate documents, the Global Compact (the Compact) and the UN
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (UN Norms), the United Nations also
has announced CSR guidelines. The Compact "asks companies to embrace,
support and enact within their sphere of influence" ten core human rights, labor,
environmental, and anti-corruption values that are derived from international
215treaties. While the Compact states lofty goals, its vagueness and lack of
enforceability undermine its effectiveness. 21 6 These weaknesses, common to CSR
codes that IGOs and corporations develop, have strengthened calls for "holding
companies accountable through legal rules for the human rights and environmental
impact of their policies," an idea echoed in the UN Norms. 217 The UN Norms
assert that, although "[s]tates have the primary responsibility.., to protect human
rights, transnational corporations and other business entities, as organs of society"
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, must also secure human rights
"[w]ithin their respective spheres of activity and influence.... ,218 Using legally
binding language, the Norms declare that corporations "shall" ensure non-
discriminatory treatment, security of persons, workers' rights, respect for human
rights and national sovereignty, and environmental protections. 21 9 However, states
have not yet adopted the Norms, and they are not in force.22 °
212. OECD Guidelines for Multinational Corporation: Revision 2000, art. 2(2), June 27, 2000, 40
I.L.M. 237, 240 available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf [hereinafter OECD
Guidelines].
213. Id. at art. 4.
214. Id. at arts. 5-7.
215. UNITED NATIONS, GLOBAL COMPACT, TEN PRINCIPLES, available at
http://www.unzlobalcompact.org (Feb. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Global Compact]. The Ten Principles are
pulled from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, The ILO's Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work, the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, and the UN
Convention Against Corruption.
216. Id.
217. United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson, Address at University
of Tubingen Second Global Ethic Lecture (Jan. 22, 2002), available at
http://www.weltethos.org/st_9_xx/9_144.htm.
218. See, U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm. on Promotion and Prot. of Human
Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003) [hereinafter
UN Norms].
219. Id. at 2-14.
220. See Office High Comm'r Human Rights, Human Rights Resolution 2005/69, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.41RES/2005/69 (Apr. 20, 2005) (requesting "the Secretary-General to appoint a special
representative on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business
enterprises, for an initial period of two years [t]o identify and clarify standards of corporate
responsibility and accountability for transnational corporations and other business enterprises with
regard to human rights); Larry Cata Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: The
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Finally, while the ILO always has protected worker's rights, 221 in recent years
it has imposed more corporate social responsibilities directly on employers. For
example, the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy establishes a comprehensive framework of
employment promotion, training, wage, workplace safety and security, and
collective bargaining standards for MNCs in developing countries to follow, with
the goal of "encourag[ing] the positive contributions which multinational
enterprises can make to economic and social progress.... 222  More recently
adopted, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
"[d]eclares that all Members... have an obligation.., to respect, to promote and to
realize, in good faith the principles concerning the fundamental rights of ILO
Conventions. 223 These rights include "freedom of association and the effective
recognition of the right to collective bargaining; the elimination of all forms of
forced or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and occupation.'
224
The 1995 Mines Convention requires employers to "eliminate risks" and to
"ensure that the mine... provide[s] conditions for safe operation and a healthy
working environment. 225  Recognizing that undeveloped laws in host countries
may not protect employees, the Mines Convention also provides that, "where
appropriate," employers must supplement national standards with "technical
standards, guidelines or codes of practice. 226  Likewise, under the 2001
Agriculture Convention, employers must "ensure the safety and health of workers
in every aspect related to work."
C. Voluntary Corporate Codes of Conduct
Finally, many corporations have drafted and implemented voluntary, self-
imposed codes of conduct. The Sullivan Principles, one of the first CSR codes
United Nations' Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger of
Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REv. 287, 298
(2006).
221. See, e.g., Constitution of the International Labor Organization, June 28, 1919, 49 Stat. 2712,
15 U.N.T.S. 35; Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to
Organise, July 9, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; Convention concerning the Application of the Principles of the
Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, July 1, 1949, 96 U.N.T.S. 257.
222. International Labor Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, adopted by the Governing Body of the International Labor
Office, 204th Sess., Nov. 1977, as revised by the Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning
Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, ILO, 279th Sess., Nov. 17, 2000 [hereinafter Tripartite
Declaration], available at http://www.oit.org/public/english/employment/multi/download/english.pdf.
223. International Labor Organization, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
and Its Follow-Up, adopted by the International Labor Conference, 86th Sess., 18 June 1998, art. 2




225. Convention Concerning Safety and Health in Mines, June 22, 1995, arts. 6-7, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 106-8 (1999), 2029 U.N.T.S. 209, 212 [hereinafter Mines Convention].
226. Id. at 211.
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MNCs voluntarily adopted, was developed to help promote ethical corporate
behavior in South Africa during apartheid.227 Since formation of the Sullivan
Principles, many MNCs have written and passed their own CSR codes.228 These
codes vary greatly. While some merely describe good practices to which the
corporation should aspire, others state specific human rights principles.
Royal Dutch Shell's CSR code states broad principles, emphasizing the
importance of "be[ing] good neighbors" to local communities, "respect[ing] the
human rights of [its] employees", and "'conduct[ing] business as responsible
corporate members of society., 229 Similarly, YUM! Brands Inc, owner of Pizza
Hut, Taco Bell, and Kentucky Fried Chicken, has a loosely worded Supplier Code
of Conduct stating that suppliers "are expected to ensure that their workers have
safe and healthy working conditions" and "should not use workers under the legal
age for employment for the type of work being performed. 23 ° Conversely, The
Gap's Vendor Code of Conduct contains eight articles that set specific standards
for its vendors and factories. Its code outlaws discrimination based on "race, color,
gender, nationality, religion, age, maternity, or marital status" in a manner that
largely comports with articles 2 and 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and prohibits "involuntary labor of any kind" in a manner that largely
comports with article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. 231  Although less detailed than The Gap's Code of Vendor Conduct,
Adidas' Workplace Standards specifically state that "[b]usiness partners must not
employ children who are less than 15 years old" and that "[w]ages must equal or




Attention on human rights abuses associated with the activities of
multinational corporations has increased over the past decade. Corporations have
been censured for participation in and failure to prevent extra-judicial killings,
environmental degradation, labor rights violations, and other human rights abuses.
227. Henry J. Richardson II1, Reverend Leon Sullivan's Race, Principles, and International Law: A
Comment, 15 TEMPLE INT'L AND COMP. L.J. 55, 57-61 (describing how the Sullivan Principles required
corporations to give their black workers in South Africa "the same rights, treatment, advancement, and
employment benefits as would be basically required in the United States under its constitutional equal
protection standards," and required corporations to undertake infrastructure projects for the benefit of
their workers).
228. Natasha Rossell Jaffe & Jordan D. Weiss, The Self-Regulating Corporation: How Corporate
Codes Can Save Our Children, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 893, 909-10 (2006).
229. Shell Code of Conduct, available at http://www.shell.com/static/envirosoc-
en/downloads/makingiLhappen/our commitments-and standards/code of conduct/english.pdf.
230. YUM! Brands, Inc., Supplier Code of Conduct, available at
http://www.pizzahut.com/SupplierCode.aspx.
231. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19. 1966, art. 8(3), 999 U.N.T.S.
171; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., Resolutions,
Part I, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); Gap Inc. Code of Vendor Conduct, Arts. III, IV, available at
http://www.gapinc.com/public/documents/code vendor_conduct.pdf.
232. Adidas Group, Workplace Standards, available at http://www.adidas-
group.com/en/sustainability/Overview/our-standards/standards-of engagement.asp.
VOL. 35:3/4
THE EVOLUTION AND ENDPOINT OF RESPONSIBILITY
In response, IGOs and MNCs have accepted that corporations should be held
accountable to citizens of developing countries for their actions and have adopted
non-binding CSR measures. The process of developing and analyzing these
measures has furthered dialogue on the form a CSR code should take. When
viewed in light of the trend towards placing greater responsibilities on
corporations, beginning with the FCPA and extending to SOX, and in light of the
rise of SO governments in Latin America, the adoption of CSR codes by
intergovernmental organizations and MNCs suggests the international community
is moving towards developing a binding code of corporate social responsibility.
V. THE FINAL FRONTIER: A CODE OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
Although the international community is moving toward creating a binding
CSR code, designing such a code will be difficult. Various hurdles complicate and
block its development. These hurdles include MNCs' ambiguous responsibilities
under international law,233 disagreement over the degree to which corporations
may pursue goals other than maximizing profit, 234 corporate resistance to costly
CSR regulations,235 developed states' reluctance to impose CSR regulations on
their multinationals, 236 many developing states' resistance to measures that might
hurt their competitiveness as a destination for FDI vis a vis other states, 237 and still
other obstacles as well. As countries, IGOs, and scholars debate whether a binding
CSR code is both palatable and possible, and disagree over the structure such a
code should take, they must balance the competing interests that complicate
development a CSR code.
Below, I propose a framework for an enforceable CSR code. This framework
does not analyze and resolve every problem countries, corporations, and civil
society organizations will encounter as they construct a binding CSR code.
However, this framework does present a novel, potentially useful structure for
developing and implementing an enforceable code of corporate social
responsibility.
A. Weaknesses of Existing Corporate Social Responsibility Measures
The social responsibility measures countries and corporations have adopted in
recent years are praiseworthy. They recognize that corporations not only have a
responsibility to maximize profits, but also to protect their workers, communities,
and surrounding environments. Nonetheless, various weaknesses limit the
effectiveness of existing CSR measures.
The voluntary guidelines that states and IGOs have enacted are
unenforceable.238 Countries and corporations that sign these measures do not
233. See Ratner, supra note 19, at 511.
234. See Backer, supra note 220, at 298-99.
235. Sorcha MacLeod, Corporate Social Responsibility Within the European Union Framework, 23
WIS. INT'L L.J. 541, 551-52 (2005).
236. Backer, supra note 220, at 381-83.
237. Guzman, supra note 18, at 671-74.
238. See EU Code, supra note 205; Green Paper, supra note 208; Voluntary Principles, supra note
209; OECD Guidelines, supra note 212; Global Compact, supra note 215; U.N. Norms, supra note 218.
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accept binding obligations. Thus, countries and corporations can sign to curry
political capital, and then choose the degree to which they will abide by their
gratuitous promises. Furthermore, these codes are universal, applying identical
standards to all countries regardless of each country's particular culture, needs, and
resources.239 This approach eschews reality in favor of utopian, largely western
measures that corporations in many states cannot fulfill.
For example, it is naive to believe that foreign subsidiaries of U.S. firms
operating in Saudi Arabia could comply with western employment discrimination
standards, or that a CSR code could eradicate child labor in Africa and Asia. If
employment discrimination were outlawed universally and discrimination against
women in Saudi Arabia occurred, the code's enforcement body would face two
unappealing choices: it could prosecute the transgressing MNC, offending Saudi
sovereignty and values, or it could exculpate the MNC, undermining the
enforcement body's authority and legitimacy.24 °  Furthermore, universal
compliance could cause more harm than good. "In the poorest nations an abrupt
halt to child labor is likely to cause children to suffer acute poverty and hunger,"
241and may push children into black market labor and prostitution. Placing
stringent, western environmental standards on developing countries, standards
many developed states have begun to follow only during the last ten years, would
protect the environment while retarding economic growth.242
Corporations' CSR codes pose even greater enforcement difficulties. These
guidelines not only are self-drafted and self-adopted, but also self-enforced,
leaving corporations to implement, monitor, and enforce them in a perverse
concentration of power.243 Moreover, voluntary corporate codes apply only to the
small percentage of MNCs that create them, offer a moral platform for egregious
rights abuses, 2 44 and either may not reach foreign subsidiaries or only reach
foreign subsidiaries.24 5
239. See EU Code, supra note 205; OECD Guidelines, supra note 212; UN. Norms, supra note
218.
240. Consider that the U.N. and international community have failed to prevent mass killings in
recent years in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Iraq, Lebanon, and Darfur. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON
S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTs ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE
NUREMBERG LEGACY 56 (2d ed., 200 1).
241. Kaushik Basu, Compacts, Conventions, and Codes: Initiatives for Higher International Labor
Standards, 34 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 487, 491 (2001).
242. Tracy M. Schmidt, Transnational Corporate Responsibility for International Environmental
and Human Rights Violations: Will the United Nations' "Norms" Provide the Required Means?, 36
CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 217, 220-21 (2005).
243. Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 401 (2005).
244. Richardson, supra note 227, at 58, 62.
245. Murphy, supra note 243, at 401; see e.g. Gap Inc. Code of Vendor Conduct, supra note 231;
Adidas Group, Workplace Standards, supra note 232; The Coca Cola Company, Supplier Guiding
Principles, available at http://www.thecoca-
colacompany.com/citizenship/supplier-guiding-principles.html.
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B. Proposed Framework for a Creating a Binding Code of Corporate Social
Responsibility
Analysis of the problems with existing CSR measures reveals that, while a
CSR code must be legally binding to regulate corporations effectively, a code also
must remain flexible to prevent self-implosion. Below, I propose a two-level
framework, an implementation process, and an enforcement mechanism that can be
used to construct a CSR code that is binding, pliant, and effective at holding MNCs
legally accountable for the social impacts of their activities.
1. Level One: Non-Binding, Universal Human Rights Standards
The first level of a CSR code should state baseline, non-binding human rights
standards. These standards should be phrased as aspirations that MNCs should
strive to follow and states should promote. Level one standards could be modeled
after the Global Compact, though should include more details than the Compact's
ten general principles.246 Level one should avoid the specific terms and binding
language the UN Norms employ.247 Provisions should define common political
and bodily (e.g. slavery, rape, extrajudicial killings), labor (e.g. wages, child labor,
occupational safety), social (e.g. indigenous people) and environmental (e.g. water
and air pollution, damming) human rights standards. Articulating baseline
standards will further dialogue and agreement on MNCs' human rights duties and
provide structure for developing state-tailored, enforceable responsibilities in the
second level of the proposed framework.248
2. Level Two: Binding, State Specific Codes
Level two should contain the code's substantive, binding terms. Because
OECD countries produce a large majority of the world's multinational corporations
and FDI, I suggest matching one representative from an OECD country with one
representative from each non-OECD, ratifying host state (host state). 249 Together,
through input from MNCs and civil society, these teams of two should adopt
legally binding CSR duties based on level one's standards. These duties should
regulate the activities of MNCs operating in each host state and should be tailored
to each host state's unique needs, culture, and resources. This level must use
enforceable, binding language ("MNCs shall..."), clearly informing states and
MNCs that noncompliance will result in penalties.
By tailoring binding measures to each country's dynamics, the code would
account for different conceptions of an adequate standard of living, discrimination,
and bribery. If child labor is needed in a given country to help feed and shelter
families, that country's team of two may permit it under certain conditions that
246. Global Compact, supra note 215.
247. U.N. Norms, supra note 218.
248. Bennett Freeman et al., A New Approach To Corporate Responsibility: The Voluntary
Principles on Security and Human Rights, 24 HASTINGS INT'L. COMP. L. REV. 423, 433-35 (2001).
249. Outward FDI Flows (1970-2005), in UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND
DEVELOPMENT, WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2005: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF R&D (2005) (reporting that, in 2005, 83% of all FDI came from developed
countries).
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perhaps demand parental permission, prohibit overtime, and require MNCs to hire
independent managers who monitor the treatment of children. 5 ° Countries
plagued by corruption can enact stringent bribery laws while permitting generic
occupational safety standards because their governments already address that issue.
Thus, industry specific standards are not needed. Instead, country specific
standards would provide flexibility while, at the same time, mandatory language
would make adherence to these standards legally binding.
Some may contend flexibility will provide a platform for countries to set
weak standards. However, a realistic approach tailored to each state's unique
history, resources, cultures, and needs is vital; compliance with modest but
realizable standards is better than disregard for unattainable ideals. 251 Moreover,
the code can prevent the watering down of human rights duties by pairing together
OECD and host state representatives whose countries have few investment
connections, and thus little interest in collusion. Every few years the teams of two
should evaluate the customized duties. If tighter child labor laws are needed, the
government can enact such measures; if the cost of living has increased, the teams
can raise minimum wages.
Others may contend host states competing for FDI would not ratify a code
that regulates MNCs more closely and, in turn, hurts their competitiveness vis a vis
other countries.252 However, a code can encourage ratification through an
investment freeze that prohibits ratifying states from making new investments in
non-ratifying countries. An investment freeze would goad states that have not
ratified the treaty to ratify it through fear of stagnant foreign investment. As more
states ratify, non-ratifying states would become increasingly isolated. Faced with
either isolation or integration, many states would choose integration and ratify the
code knowing their sovereignty, cultures, economy, and needs would not be
jeopardized. Still, the details of an investment freeze would need refinement to
prevent ratifying states from losing investment opportunities. Perhaps the freeze
should be implemented after fifty states have ratified the code, or limited to certain
sectors of each non-ratifying state's economy.
3. The Code Committee
An executive body should oversee the code's procedural niceties,
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement. I suggest creating a code
committee to handle these tasks. The committee could consist of 11 members
representing the four major stakeholder groups corporations, developed
countries, developing countries, and civil society and could be elected by
ratifying states every few years, with one vote per state. Four members should hail
from OECD states, three from developing states, and two each from MNCs and
250. See Basu, supra note 241, at 491 (noting that "[p]arents do not typically send their children to
work out of sloth but rather out of desperation.").
251. See Id. at 496 (emphasizing the need for democratization of international organizations in
order to account for the interests of developing states).
252. Guzman, supra note 18, at 671-74.
VOL. 35:3/4
THE EVOLUTION AND ENDPOINT OF RESPONSIBILITY
NGOs. This arrangement would balance power within the committee and prevent
an individual stakeholder group from assuming control.
The committee could be charged with various tasks. It could approve all
OECD and host state "teams of two" in order to combat collusion between OECD
countries and host states and ensure representatives are disinterested. The
committee also could field complaints about countries' level two codes, such as
allegations that a code is watered down or ignored, and either resolve the issue
amicably or refer it to a tribunal. Amendments to procedural matters, such as the
process for selecting country representatives, committee members, and tribunal
members, and amendments to substantive matters, such as increases in level one's
baseline standards, could be approved by a majority vote of the committee. As the
code is drafted and implemented, additional responsibilities would be conferred
upon the committee.
4. Enforcement
States' level two human rights obligations must be legally binding and
enforceable. Unenforceable obligations lack capacity to punish violations and
foment change; perhaps galvanizing MNCs around shared norms, but failing to
ensure that practice follows speech.253 Empowering a tribunal with enforcement
authority will deter violations, promote responsible corporate activity, and
compensate the injured. Moreover, consistent and fair enforcement will increase
the code's legitimacy, preventing the emasculation and loss of authority that
plague many international treaties.
Any entity, including individuals, NGOs, businesses, and states, should be
allowed to bring a complaint alleging a corporation violated its level two corporate
social responsibilities. The code should require complaints to be brought initially
before the representative of the host state where the supposed violation occurred
and that representative's OECD counterpart. Because MNCs often do not intend
to violate human rights and, especially when violations are committed by
contractors or licensees, MNCs may not be aware that violations are occurring, the
team of two should discuss the situation with the MNC and attempt to resolve it
amicably.25 4 If the MNC accepts responsibility and works with the team of two in
creating and implementing a solution, referral to a tribunal would not be
necessary. 255  This initial, non-confrontational process is fashioned after the
OECD's national contact points system. 25 6 It would be an efficient, cost-effective,
and fair method of settling many complaints, especially baseless claims, minor
infractions, and violations corporations are willing to address. The country
253. Elisa Westfield, Globalization, Governance, and Multinational Corporations: Corporate
Codes of Conduct in the 21st Century, 42 VA. INT'L L.J. 1075, 1078 (2002).
254. See Ratner, supra note 19, at 518-520 (noting that corporations can have varying levels of
knowledge of rights abuses based on how much control parents have over their subsidiaries).
255. See e.g., Voluntary Principles, supra note 209 (establishing a voluntary guide that encourages
collaboration between the extractive industry and host states).
256. OECD Guidelines, supra note 212, at Part 2: Implementation Procedures of the OECD
Guidelines for Multinational Corporations, art. I.
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representatives should report to the committee every six months on the
corporation's compliance with remedial measures.
In some cases, however, human rights violations may be especially egregious,
the corporation may deny responsibility, or the team of two may disagree on an
appropriate resolution. An informal enforcement process would not be adequate in
such instances. Instead, the complaint should be referred to a tribunal that
adjudicates alleged code violations. Each ratifying country could nominate one
judge who, after receiving the committee's approval, would be available to serve
on tribunals. Seven judges could decide each case by majority vote; perhaps two
nominated by the host state, two by the home state, two by the complainant, and
one by the MNC, to ensure fair representation. All MNCs incorporated as
businesses in ratifying states would be subject to the court's jurisdiction, allowing
the court to collect money judgments from MNCs and grant injunctive relief.
Beyond these details, the committee would need to fine tune the judicial
process and resolve difficult questions. May the committee or a tribunal override
the OECD and host state representatives' enforcement decisions, either placing a
claim on the tribunal's docket or releasing a case from tribunal back to the
representatives? On how many tribunals may a single judge serve? How should
tribunal proceedings be drafted? Would appeals be possible? What types of
damages would be available? May tribunals enforce creative remedies, such as
requiring a MNC to provide education for child laborers? May tribunals issue
advisory opinions?
C. Conclusion
Existing CSR codes have weaknesses, such as a lack of enforceability and a
universal application, that limit their effectiveness. These weaknesses require a
new framework for structuring a CSR code. The dual level approach presented in
this section provides such a framework, placing legally binding duties on
corporations while tailoring those duties to each country's individual culture,
needs, and resources. The code committee and enforcement mechanisms
strengthen the proposed framework's ability to regulate the social effects of
corporate activities. Admittedly, this framework is not a panacea and leaves many
questions unanswered. However, this section's goal is not to propose a final
solution for structuring a CSR code. Rather, it is to contribute to the discussion on
how to place corporate social responsibilities on multinational corporations.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Over the past thirty years, as corporations have amassed wealth and power,
the United States and the international community slowly have responded by
placing greater responsibilities on corporations. First, a pandemic of corporate
bribery prompted the United States to pass the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in
1977, and to expand the act's jurisdiction and substance in 1998, placing various
anti-bribery responsibilities on corporations. The international community
followed suit, drafting similar measures. Soon after the U.S. and international
community developed anti-corruption measures, corporate governance problems in
the United States led to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Sarbanes-Oxley
places new duties on corporations, tightens regulations, and demands even greater
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corporate responsibility. The U.K. and the EU also have grown concerned with
corporate governance problems, and have adopted measures similar to SOX to
solve these problems.
While states worldwide have been placing heightened responsibilities on
corporations, governments throughout Latin America have adopted socialist-
oriented policies. Their efforts to protect their workers and economies from harms
that have accompanied the spread of multinationals in Latin America are consistent
with interest in greater corporate social responsibility and a CSR code. At the
same time, the international community and multinational corporations have
drafted various non-binding measures that are rooted in the FCPA's and SOX's
trend towards placing greater responsibilities on corporations, though these
measures impose a new type of responsibility on MNCs - social responsibility for
employees, communities, the environment, and society.
Although existing CSR measures are commendable, they also are
unenforceable. If states, the international community, MNCs, and civil society
truly wish to regulate the social problems that have accompanied corporations into
developing countries, these stakeholders must work together to overcome
weaknesses in existing measures and to develop a binding CSR code. This article
offers a dual level framework for constructing such a code that hopefully can
contribute to the dialogue on how to ensure that, as corporate power grows,
corporate responsibility for workers, communities, and the environment will grow
as well.
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